TACKLING ASIA’S GREATEST CHALLENGES

U.S.-JAPAN-VIETNAM TRILATERAL REPORT

Harry J. Kazianis, Editor

June 2015
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Strengthening Strategic Partnerships: An Introduction to Our Trilateral Dialogue

By Wallace C. Gregson

In 2012, with the cooperation and support of the Center for Global Progress, scholars and policy practitioners from the United States, Vietnam, and Japan began development of a trilateral dialogue. The nations were represented by the Center for the National Interest in the United States, the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, and the Research Institute for Peace and Security in Japan.

Our goal was to explore opportunities for greater cooperation on matters of common interests. Creating such enhanced dialogue and cooperation at the “Track 2” level among scholars and policy practitioners was the logical course of action, given the pressures and demands on officials in each country. Events at that time argued strongly for enhanced dialogue and cooperation among our three nations. Events since the beginning of the project highlighted the value of trilateral cooperation among our three nations; and events following the conclusion of our discussion have done nothing to diminish that value.

Asia is widely acknowledged as the fastest-growing region in the world and the home of remarkable economic success. Millions have emerged from poverty to greater standards of living in the last few decades. Yet Asia’s success in this globalized era brings its own challenges. Among these are rising sea levels and the increasing frequency of and damage from natural and manmade disasters, pandemic disease outbreaks, ever-increasing demands for energy, and disputes over territory and resources. Vietnam is still recovering from conditions created by intense warfare over three decades after the end of World War II. All of these conditions require trilateral—and indeed multilateral—attention.

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Asia also hosts great-power competition. The rise of China was not a singular focus of our trilateral project, but it was and is an ever-present factor in every aspect of the events and conditions that drive policies, strategies, economic development, diplomacy, and security in Asia. For its part, the United States supports the reintegration of a rising China into the international system as a productive participant. That’s settled policy from a time before the United States championed China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. U.S. policy is an Asia policy with China as a component, not a bilateral “China” policy. With that as background, our trilateral discussions looked at security, but in the broadest sense, with due attention to the many challenges of the region. These included maritime security, trade and economics, energy demands and reactions, and disaster reliance and response.

We stand on the shoulders of many who have been conducting such dialogues for years. Since the Cold War, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been called the “linchpin” of security in the Asia-Pacific and the “cornerstone” of the U.S. strategic presence in the region, and this is still very much the case. However, throughout the Asia-Pacific region, minilaterals and multilaterals of various shapes, sizes, and permutations have been cropping up for decades—some to address a particular crisis or event, such as the multilateral humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief efforts after the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and resulting tsunami, and others represented more protracted efforts, such as the Six-Party Talks, which attempted to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. But of course, none of these examples have supplanted the U.S.-led hub and spoke model.

Yet the idea of “fortified” or “enriched” bilateralism leading to trilateral cooperation has become more and more popular in the 21st century. Examples include: U.S.-Japan-India, U.S.-Japan-Australia, and U.S.-Japan-China (so often the common denominator being the U.S.-Japan alliance). We believe these trilaterals are increasingly useful for several reasons. First, they promote burden sharing—increasingly important given the economic woes our two countries are facing. Second, they enhance the alliance’s role and visibility in regional security. Finally, they contribute to U.S., Vietnamese, and Japanese capabilities.

We see a compelling opportunity for trilateral dialogue involving the United States, Japan, and Vietnam—an underexplored potential partner with many shared concerns. Though U.S.-Vietnamese relations remain deeply marked by a history of war, Washington and Hanoi have made considerable progress toward rapprochemen, beginning with President Clinton’s normalization of relations in 1995 with the solid support of many former prisoners of that war.
elected to high U.S. office. A Comprehensive Partnership was established in 2013. Since that time, relations between these two countries have grown increasingly “normal.” Vietnam’s budding commercial relationship with the United States and Japan and Vietnam’s long, contested littoral on the South China Sea argue for increasing the number of avenues of engagement between our three countries.

Japan and Vietnam have a long history of strong bilateral ties. Today, Japan is Vietnam’s single-largest aid donor and is the third-largest investor in the country. 2013 marked the 40th anniversary of Japanese-Vietnamese diplomatic relations, a milestone celebrated by declaring 2014 “Japan-Vietnam Friendship Year.” In March 2014, Japan and Vietnam established an extensive strategic partnership to promote cooperation between the forces of the Vietnamese People’s Army and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). The agreement calls for advanced cooperation in human-resources development, capacity building, and ship visits.

Japan and Vietnam also have in common extensive littoral areas on the most important and contested seas in the world. The East China Sea and to a greater extent the South China Sea host an incredible amount of the world’s commerce on any given day (over $5 trillion in seaborne trade alone per year in the case of the South China Sea). The seas’ coral reefs and biological diversity provide sustenance for much of the fish that nourish Asia and beyond. Belief that the seas could provide resources for energy production has given new urgency to many territorial issues. Finally, the interests of China and the United States overlap in these seas, in addition to those of Japan and Vietnam. The South China Sea has been called the most dangerous area in the world, as it is the one area where superpower interests overlap. These issues will define Asia for decades to come.

U.S.-Japanese relations continue to broaden and deepen. During the time of our trilateral discussions, we noted Japan’s remarkable diplomatic, political, and security achievements under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s leadership. These include the publication of a new National Security Strategy, and the creation of a national-security council to better coordinate policy and strategy, and better serve the prime minister in the execution of his duties. Japan also performed a deliberate and public examination of the Japanese Constitution and its intent on Collective Self-Defense as defined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The conclusion was that the obligation of Japan to ensure the security and prosperity of its citizens can only be met through a carefully defined execution of the right of Collective Self-Defense. Laws are now being crafted for submission to the Diet to define and implement the
necessary policies. Japan also published new National Defense Program Guidelines and together with the United States, announced and published New Guidelines of U.S.-Japan Cooperation. The recent publication of the new Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, for only the third time in the history of the alliance, marks a major advancement in the relationship, and promises the development of a much-more-effective deterrent capability.

Additionally, Japan will now begin to export select military goods and articles under the newly revised Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. Laws on the protection of secrets were enacted to better ensure information security in this age of growing theft of intellectual property and classified information. Furthermore, the defense budget was increased by 1.8 percent. These initiatives greatly strengthen our bonds of cooperation and security and open pathways to greater international cooperation, specifically with Vietnam. Taken together, these achievements enhance Japan’s security structure and Japan’s critical support for the U.S. policy of rebalance to the Asian region.

As this trilateral is concluding, negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement are finally moving forward. Japan and Vietnam are critical components of this effort. This twelve-nation agreement promises to shape globalization, get the relationships right to ensure common success and prosperity, and ensure that all are able to benefit from the great potential across the Pacific and Asia.

As a group, Hanoi, Tokyo, and Washington were in an excellent position to establish this trilateral dialogue—they boast an increasing number of common interests and priorities, including maritime security in the South China Sea, as well as nuclear safety and security. The United States and Japan also have existing, if tentative, bilateral security relationships with Vietnam. The United States and Vietnam signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on defense cooperation in September 2011, and Japan and Vietnam signed one the following month.

The project included a series of four workshops held in Washington, Tokyo, Hanoi, and then Washington again. It includes the publication of this policy report, which covers four of the most important topics covered in our meetings. Our work in the following pages not only describes and analyzes some of the most pressing problems in the Asia-Pacific region today, but also offers recommendations to jointly address such challenges—enhancing relations between our countries in the process.
The workshops were off-the-record—except where permission to quote was granted—to allow for frank and candid discussions. Each country sent four participants to each host location. The workshops included approximately fifteen to twenty participants based in the host country. These host-country participants included experts, as well as working-level government officials, legislative staff, business representatives, journalists, and academics. Embassy officials were invited to participate as appropriate. Participants prepared discussion papers in advance of the meeting.

This project explored four primary topics, although additional themes emerged based on topics that arose from contemporary events and out of interesting options identified from the initial workshops—three of which are discussed extensively in this report. The four primary topics included:

**Maritime-Security Capacity Building**

Security cooperation in the form of training engagements focused on maritime patrol aircraft offers opportunities to strengthen maritime security. Considering Vietnam’s extensive coastline, enhancing maritime-domain awareness is critical to countering threats ranging from illegal fishing to narcotics trafficking to illegal resource exploration and extraction.

The Vietnamese Marine Police and Vietnamese Navy have taken (and will continue to take) possession of new maritime patrol aircraft, including the Airbus C212 400 and the Viking Air Twin Otter 400 over the next two years. The Vietnamese Navy continues to build its strength with the procurement of modern surface vessels from Denmark and Norway. Submarines have been procured from Russia. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has experienced P-3 Orion crews with skill sets that would be very capable of engaging in training for the maritime surveillance mission.

Maritime Patrol Aircraft are an important platform for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, performing initial reconnaissance of disaster sites and providing initial command and control of early responders. These aircraft are indispensable to maritime rescue efforts. Patrolling this domain has the benefit of meeting Vietnamese concerns over South China Sea maritime disputes without being explicitly antagonistic toward other regional players, as these platforms have a dual-use character.

The United States should engage Vietnam on the command and control component of supporting these maritime patrol aircraft. A U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Safety and Security Team (MSST) could also support Vietnamese capacity building of its Marine Police, an objective identified by senior Vietnamese officer Lt. Gen. Pham Duc Linh during conversations in 2011.
Capacity Building for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

The JSDF and U.S. forces acquired important joint and combined HA/DR expertise during Operation Tomodachi. The U.S. Marines Corps made a unique contribution to capacity building, having conducted chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) training last year in Japan. It is especially valuable to extend such bilateral and unilateral efforts into a trilateral mechanism, particularly since natural and nuclear disasters rapidly become transnational concerns. Tokyo and Washington agreed on the importance of launching a regional HA/DR hub in Japan at the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee in June 2011. This was a golden opportunity for the three countries to present the hub as a model of HA/DR collaboration to the international community. Furthermore, this concerted effort will enhance regional safety and stability.

During the course of this dialogue, Japan demonstrated its emerging national capability and willingness to respond in this important area. Typhoon Haiyan, one of the strongest storms on record, struck the Philippines with destructive force. Japan was one of the very early and strong responders, with an amphibious force, including ships, service members and nongovernmental-organization personnel. Japan’s prompt, generous, and effective action saved lives and property and aided rapid recovery. The Philippine ambassador to Japan was actually moved enough to specifically and pointedly refer to Japan as “an ally” of the Philippines in a speech in Tokyo some weeks later.

Nuclear Energy and Safety

Energy demand and environmental preservation are in tension in Asia as a whole, and in Vietnam and Japan in particular. Technical capability and available land and sea areas that can be used for production of renewable energy are both lacking. Questions remain about nuclear power, but there are strong arguments in favor of nuclear-energy generation if we are to meet the exponentially growing demands for energy in this rapidly developing region. The greater good would appear to be in support of safe and secure nuclear-power generation.

Vietnam, Japan, and the United States are already very well placed to work together on nuclear energy and safety issues. As of January 2012, the United States agreed to move ahead on bilateral civil nuclear trade agreements with Vietnam, and on June 2012, the Japan Atomic Energy Company reached an agreement to conduct a feasibility study to build Vietnam’s first nuclear plant,
marking an important step in Japan’s efforts to export its nuclear technology. By 2030, Vietnam aims to build ten reactors, and by 2050, it hopes to generate enough nuclear power to account for 20-25 percent of its energy consumption. Therefore, trilateral capacity building, information sharing and joint exercises for HA/DR in the case of nuclear disaster are critically important.

**Trade**

The United States, Japan, and Vietnam support the TPP. Former U.S. under secretary of state Robert Hormats said that Vietnam is an important U.S. partner in negotiations for the TPP. The results of the negotiations will open up opportunities for both countries in strengthening trade, increasing development, expanding markets, and improving the investment environment. Japan’s strong decision to join the TPP provides a critical foundation for further progress. Rare earth elements (REEs), necessary for new energy technologies, are but one example of the potential importance of the TPP. REEs have significant national-security applications, and the United States, Japan, and Vietnam all worry about the emergence of monopolistic tendencies.

As with other trade agreements, the issues with the TPP are at the retail politics and economic level. Protectionist instincts in different sectors generate opposition. This can be seen in the U.S. automotive industry and in Japan’s agricultural sector. TPP negotiations bring twelve nations into the process and have been going on for some time. Gaining closure will require the expenditure of political capital and ingenious devices and provisions within the agreement to provide a productive outcome for all. As our trilateral effort concludes, this is still an open issue.

Highlighting the importance of the TPP, China announced its creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and invited various nations of the world to join. Despite U.S. efforts to dissuade allies and friends from joining the bank by highlighting questions about how it would be governed, some twenty-one nations—including the United Kingdom, Singapore, and Thailand—have applied.

Capitalistic and economic competition may come to be a far more effective riposte than diplomacy. If successful, the TPP will become an effective trade and economic engine. Coupled with new energy in established institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, a new era in
development across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region can emerge to the benefit of all.

The Content of Our Report

There is no question that Asia as it exists today is one of the most complex geostrategic environments on the planet—and our report reflects this. East Asia, the Asia-Pacific, and even the wider Indo-Pacific hold great possibilities for cooperation, but at the same time, great-power rivalry, history, nationalism, and economic competition combine to create a number of different roadblocks that are hindering a truly dynamic “Asian-Century.”

The goal of our final report was to reflect the different views, opinions, and areas of focus each nation and various individuals brought to our discussions, as well as provide recommendations for how to grow the trilateral relationship over the long term.

Masashi Nishihara, president of the Research Institute for Peace and Security in Japan, focused his contribution on important economic interactions between all three nations. He explains that all three countries over the last several years have clearly worked to enhance their overall bilateral trade relationships and offers important and timely recommendations towards a more comprehensive trilateral economic relationship in the future.

Hoang Anh Tuan, director-general of the Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, and Nguyen Vu Tung, vice president of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and director-general of the Institute of East Sea Studies at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, describe in their contribution the importance of maritime issues in Asia, taking on a controversial topic that has recently been in the news: maritime and territorial challenges in the South China Sea. Both authors break down and explain in intricate detail not only the importance of maritime commence in this integral body of water where trillions of dollars of seaborne trade passes through every year, but also how growing tensions could create a dangerous crisis. They also offer recommendations on how cooperation between the three nations—with specific focus on the U.S.-Japan alliance—could be useful when it comes to obstacles in the South China Sea and various maritime challenges throughout Asia.

Harry Kazianis, executive editor of The National Interest and senior fellow for Defense Policy at the Center for the National Interest, considers the challenge of China’s 2013 Air Defense Identification Zone declaration.
Kazianis explains the complex reasoning behind Beijing’s declaration with a look towards perhaps an even-more-important future question: Will China create another such zone in the South China Sea? He then concludes by offering recommendations that include both incentives and deterring strategies, all in an effort to change Beijing’s calculus towards such a move in the future.

Finally, I round out the report discussing an issue of importance that does not receive the level of attention that it should, until disaster strikes—that of humanitarian aid and disaster relief. Through the lens of recent events in the Philippines and Typhoon Haiyan, but also looking towards the future where infectious disease could present even bigger challenges, I argue that greater trilateral cooperation is needed in order to adequately and effectively respond to future humanitarian disasters.
A Growing Climate for Trilateral Economic Cooperation

By Masashi Nishihara

Recent events are merging with shared strategic interests to form the basis of a strong economic partnership between the United States, Vietnam, and Japan. In July 2013, when Vietnamese president Truong Tan Sang visited Washington for the first time and signed an agreement with U.S. president Barack Obama regarding a bilateral “comprehensive partnership,” it created a strong foundation for future economic cooperation between the three nations. In 2008, Japan and Vietnam signed a bilateral economic partnership agreement (EPA)—the first such agreement for Hanoi. All three nations are also members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and are all aspirants to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which could boost their economic ties considerably.

While all three countries share various common interests, they also differ in several important points of comparison. For example, all three countries have different population sizes (Japan: 127 million, United States: 325 million, and Vietnam: 93 million). All are in different stages of economic development (See table on next page: GDP per capita in 2013: Japan: $38,634, United States: $53,042, and Vietnam: $1,910), urbanization, and globalization, and have distinctive political histories due to different political systems. Their dissimilar geopolitical environments affect their respective priorities for the distribution of their national resources. Yet there is a growing climate for closer economic cooperation between all three nations. A look at specific opportunities in several key areas clearly demonstrates how trilateral cooperation can be enhanced. These include: (1) stronger economic ties between Japan and Vietnam and between the United States and Vietnam in the realms of trade and investment; (2) the TPP; (3) development aid to Vietnam; (4) Mekong Delta development; and (5) nuclear energy.

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1 The author serves as president of the Research Institute for Peace and Security based in Tokyo, Japan.
Vietnam: An Economic Opportunity for Japan and the United States

Vietnam’s Enhanced Trade Status

According to 2013 trade statistics, Japan ($25.2 billion) was the fourth-largest trading partner for Vietnam after China ($50.2 billion), the United States ($29.7 billion), and South Korea ($27.3 billion). Vietnam held a large trade deficit with China and South Korea, whereas it had a large trade surplus with the United States ($24.7 billion for exports and $5.0 billion for imports). Japan had a fairly balanced trade relationship with Vietnam (See Table below: $11.6 billion in exports and $13.6 billion for imports).

The United States entered the Vietnamese market later than Japan did. Washington and Hanoi normalized their official relations in 1995, whereas Tokyo established diplomatic relations in 1973, twenty-two years earlier. During the Vietnam War, Japan was already a large trading partner of South

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Vietnam. It began to extend economic aid to unified Vietnam after 1975. However, in 1978, when Vietnam invaded Cambodia, Japan imposed economic sanctions, except for humanitarian aid, until 1991 when sanctions were lifted.

The United States imposed a trade embargo on all of Vietnam in 1975 and prohibited all bilateral trade activities. It was not until 1994 that the United States lifted its trade embargo. A bilateral trade agreement (BTA) was signed in July 2000, with trade quickly growing thereafter.

In 2006, the U.S. government granted permanent, normal trade-relations status to Vietnam, which was part of Vietnam’s accession to the WTO. In 2007, Vietnam joined the WTO as the 159th member. Vietnam and the United States concluded a trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA) that year. The two governments’ representatives met on a regular basis under the TIFA to implement Vietnam’s WTO commitments and resolve their economic- and legal-reform issues. In 2013, trade between the United States and Vietnam totaled $29.7 billion. Vietnam was the twenty-ninth-largest trading partner for the United States, but the United States was the second-largest trading partner for Vietnam after China.

**Main Imports, Exports, and Points of Contention**

In 2013, Japan’s main exports to Vietnam were apparel (17.5 percent) and crude oil (15.3 percent), while its main imports from Vietnam were machinery and equipment (25.5 percent), computer-related equipment and parts (15.6 percent), and iron and scrap (12.5 percent). Top U.S. exports to Vietnam included agricultural products (23.2 percent), food manufactures (16.3 percent), and computer and electronic products (14.3 percent), whereas top U.S. imports from Vietnam were apparel and household goods—cotton (17 percent), apparel and other textiles (16 percent), and furniture, household items, and baskets (11 percent).

Both Tokyo and Washington are concerned over the large role that state-owned enterprises still play in Vietnam over the industrial sector, such as mining and energy, and also the formal and informal control by the

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Nishihara

Vietnamese government over prices in the market. America treats Vietnam as a “nonmarket economy” under its trade law, while Hanoi wants this designation to be changed to “market economy.” Yet on the whole, the Vietnamese economy is growing quickly, providing benefits to both itself and its two partners.

Expanding Investment

Since 2006, foreign direct investment in Vietnam has been growing rapidly. The sum of investment for 2007 was $8 billion, increasing to $11.5 billion the following year. In 2013, Japan was the top investor in Vietnam. Tokyo’s investment of $5.75 billion is one quarter of the total amount of direct foreign investment ($21.63 billion) that Vietnam approved that year (see table on next page for additional information). The accumulated investment ($230.16 billion) that year also placed Japan ($34.58 billion or 15.0 percent) on top. This was the result of important bilateral agreements, including the Japan-Vietnam Joint Initiative (2003), the Japan-Vietnam Investment Agreement (2004), and the bilateral EPA (2009). The Joint Initiative for investment was to formulate “an action plan” for the government and private sectors to improve Vietnam’s investment environment through five phases. The agreement was to promote the liberalization of investment and to protect investors’ rights.

In 2013, the United States was not among the top ten investors in Vietnam; however, it ranked as the seventh-largest investing country, in terms of accumulated investment, with $10.62 billion.

Vietnamese firms have begun to take interest in investing in the United States. Vietnamese furniture companies have expressed interest in investing $5 million to set up a manufacturing facility for storage furniture and kitchen cabinets.

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The Vietnamese government plans to industrialize its economy by 2020, with its electronics, agricultural-machinery, agricultural and marine-resources-processing, shipbuilding, environmental-improvement and energy-saving, and automobile and parts fields functioning as strategic industries. Prolonged labor-intensive industries and the stagnant transition to industrialization may induce foreign firms to move to other countries where labor wages are lower, as Vietnam will have to raise labor wages when supply chains enter from ASEAN countries and China.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Tough but Hopeful Talks

Background

The TPP was originally signed by four nations in May 2006: Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. Between January 2010 and July 2013, eight other nations expressed interest in signing on, including Japan, the United States, and Vietnam. While these eight countries have been negotiating to finalize an agreement, the two biggest participants are clearly Japan and the United States, whose GDPs together equal 81 percent of the total twelve possible TPP nations’ combined GDP and 29 percent of the global GDP.

As of early May 2015, negotiations between Japan and the United States have been pressing ahead. The prevailing view is that the negotiations should be settled before the end of 2015, so that the TPP will not be entangled in the upcoming U.S. presidential campaign. Yet it is difficult to see the end of negotiations in the near future, although the two sides acknowledged in late April that they are much closer to a final agreement.

Table 3 Foreign Direct Investment for Vietnam 2013

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<th>New Investment 2013</th>
<th>Cumulative Investment as of December 2013</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 Japan</td>
<td>34.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Singapore</td>
<td>29.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Republic of Korea</td>
<td>29.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 China</td>
<td>27.91</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Russia</td>
<td>15.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Hong Kong</td>
<td>12.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Taiwan</td>
<td>10.62</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Thailand</td>
<td>10.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Netherlands</td>
<td>6.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Cayman Islands</td>
<td>6.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rest</td>
<td>46.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>230.16</td>
</tr>
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Economic Benefits of the TPP

Is an enhanced partnership between Japan, the United States, and Vietnam likely to come about under the framework of the TPP? At the very least, if the TPP is adopted, the impact on all three nations could be wide reaching.

One research study estimated in 2012 that if the TPP became a reality, the United States could expect real income benefits of $77.5 billion per year and U.S. exports could increase by 124.2 billion by 2025.6 Similarly, Japan’s GDP could increase by $119.5 billion, and Vietnam’s by $46.1 billion. The same research noted that Japan’s exports would increase by $175.7 billion, and Vietnam’s by $89.1 billion.

Vietnam will probably lag behind other prospective members of the TPP in terms of opening its own market, since Hanoi’s average tariff rate is the highest (10.9 percent) among the negotiating countries.7 Nonetheless, it is speculated that if the TPP does go into effect, Vietnam will be able to compete favorably with China in exporting textiles to the U.S. market, since the United States conditions the import of Vietnamese apparel, made only from yarns of Vietnamese origin. In fact, Vietnam may be among those TPP members that benefit the most.

The TPP and the U.S. “Rebalance” to Asia

Beyond the economic realm, the TPP is an important strategic part of the U.S. “rebalance” policy—seeking to restrain China’s economic power. Japan shares with the United States the goal of promoting a regional free market along with liberal democratic principles through TPP. Yet, as of early May 2015, the two Pacific nations cannot agree on areas where important concerns remain, including automobiles and agricultural products.

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Can the United States and Japan Settle Their Differences?

In order for the United States to take a strong leadership role in bringing the TPP negotiations to a successful conclusion at an early stage, it will be necessary for Washington to accept reasonable compromises, rather than demand a full free-market order. Clearly President Obama is faced with a dilemma. Should he lower certain standards that are part of the TPP, it may be accepted by Asian countries, but it may hurt the United States over the long term. Obama would clearly be in a better negotiating position if the U.S. Congress granted him Trade Promotion Authority—which it has not as of this writing.

China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Plan: A Cautionary Note

Both Japan and the United States are cautiously watching China’s ambitious plan to establish an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The proposed bank already has over fifty nations as founding members. China’s emerging leadership in financing a large amount of capital through the bank may obstruct the U.S. leadership in expanding the TPP. It should be noted that Vietnam has already applied to join the bank. However, it is too early to tell whether Vietnam’s membership in the AIIB will complicate economic cooperation with Japan and the United States.

Official Development Aid to Vietnam: U.S. and Japanese Efforts

Japan’s Contribution

After thirteen years of Japanese economic sanctions against Vietnam over the latter’s invasion of Cambodia in late December 1978, Tokyo resumed official development aid (ODA) in 1992. Today Japan is the largest aid donor to Vietnam. Since 2011, its ODA has exceeded 200 billion or $2.5 billion ($1=¥80) per year, although it consists mostly of yen-based loans (see table below). In addition, Japan has provided grants and assistance for technical cooperation. Tokyo is extensively engaged in providing ODA in various fields, including basic infrastructure, urban sewer and drainage systems, rural development, environmental management, health-care services, human-resources development, and so on.
Japan’s recent infrastructure projects in Vietnam include the new Tan Son Nhat International Airport in Ho Chi Minh City, the 1,200-meter Can Tho Bridge in the Mekong Delta, the 6.3-kilometer-long Hai Van Pass Tunnel in Danang (the longest tunnel in Southeast Asia), and railways in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City modeled after the Tokyo Metro.

Japanese infrastructure projects occasionally suffer from graft scandals between Vietnamese and Japanese companies. In June 2014, for instance, Japan temporarily suspended new ODA to Vietnam over a large corruption scandal between the Vietnam Railway Corporation and the Japan Transportation Consultants, although it resumed later. In a 2014 survey, in terms of corruption levels, Vietnam ranked 119 out of 175 countries; Japan, 15; and the United States, 17.

America’s Contribution

The United States began to provide humanitarian aid to Vietnam after 1991, when about $1 million was given to Vietnam War victims. After President Bill Clinton lifted the trade embargo in 1994, contacts became closer with more aid beginning to flow. However, U.S. aid efforts were often hampered by frustration with Vietnam’s initial slow cooperation in providing information about American prisoners of war (POWs) and soldiers missing in action (MIA). Hanoi also had its share of frustrations related to the Vietnam War. For example, there are many mines that were buried

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throughout the countryside during the conflict that have to be cleared before infrastructure improvements can commence.

Most U.S. assistance has been in the areas of food and health, such as aid for the victims of HIV-AIDS and bird flu. Aid has also been provided for demining, economic liberalization reform, counternarcotics, anticorruption, rule of law, and so on.

The Mekong Delta Development

The Mekong River Basin is inhabited by the sixty million people of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam—85 percent of whom are engaged in agriculture. Their lives depend upon fishery resources in the river and agricultural products that rely on rainfall and irrigated river water. The Mekong River also provides a critical means of transportation. Japan and the United States share commitments to support Mekong River Basin development, as they are concerned about the gap in economic-development levels among ASEAN members, with the Indochinese members lagging behind. The “ASEAN divide” complicates its economic integration process, a process by which ASEAN is scheduled to reach the stage of “economic community” by this year.

Japan’s Role

In December 2006, Japan introduced what was called the Japan-Mekong Partnership Program. Tokyo started a process to enhance its relations with five Southeast Asian countries that share the river—namely, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. In 2008 and 2009, it held foreign- and economic-ministers meetings. In November 2009, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama held the first summit meeting with the five heads of government from the region and issued the Tokyo Declaration, which stressed the “comprehensive development” of the Mekong region. The document referred to the need to develop hard and soft infrastructure, public-private cooperation, and the environment. Tokyo committed ¥500 billion or $6.25 billion ($1=¥80) for the following three years.

America’s Role

Similarly, the United States proposed the Lower Mekong Initiative in July 2009, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton held a ministerial meeting with her counterparts from Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam in Phuket, Thailand. With respect to lower Mekong subregional economic integration
and sustainable growth, they recognized their shared concern for such issues as agriculture and food security, connectivity, education, energy security, health, and the environment.

Sharing the same concern for the environment, Japan and the United States have moved to support the environmental projects of the Mekong River Commission (MRC), composed of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, with Myanmar and China as observers. The MRC had been in existence since 1995, but its presence had declined due to other competing mechanisms.

Both Washington and Tokyo are also concerned over China’s and Laos’ water dams in the upper Mekong River and their economic impact on the lower Mekong River region. This is one area where Japan and the United States can work together for the benefit of Vietnam.

**Nuclear Energy: An Emerging Facet of Enhanced Trilateral Cooperation**

**Vietnam’s Energy Needs**

As Vietnam’s economy becomes more industrialized, it will naturally demand increasing amounts of electricity. Today, over one third of its electricity comes from hydro, one third from gas, and the rest from coal or Chinese imports. Electricity demand is projected to grow from 21 GWe (gigawatt electrical) in 2010 to 64.8 GWe in 2020 and to 125 GWe in 2030.\(^{10}\) By 2030, Vietnam plans to have about 10 percent of its electricity provided by nuclear energy.

**Will Vietnam Really Embrace Nuclear Energy?**

Vietnam’s quest to acquire nuclear energy has seen early success followed by growing challenges. Hopes ran high when construction of two nuclear reactors began in 2014, with operations to start in 2023. Reactors were to be built by Russia at Phuoc Dinh in Ninh Tuan Province in southern Vietnam. Two were supposed to be built by Japan and be operational sometime between 2024 and 2025. Prime Ministers Naoto Kan and Yoshihiko Noda visited Hanoi in October 2010 and August 2011, respectively, to promote a nuclear power plant. Despite the earthquake and tsunami that hit Fukushima

Daiichi nuclear power plants in March 2011, Vietnam was still willing to go ahead with plans to build fourteen nuclear-power reactors by 2030.

Cooperation between Washington and Hanoi seemed to cement a bright future for Vietnamese nuclear energy. In 2010, the United States and Vietnam agreed to work on a bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear-energy cooperation, or what is known as a “123 agreement.” In 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh reached an agreement under which America would be able to make its nuclear energy-related equipment, materials, and expertise available to Vietnam. The Nuclear Energy Institute estimated that Vietnam’s nuclear-power programs would result in $10 billion to $20 billion in business for U.S. companies.\(^\text{11}\)

However, the Vietnamese government stated in January 2014 that it would delay the construction of both Russia- and Japan-designed nuclear reactors to 2020.\(^\text{12}\) Vietnamese citizens’ concerns about nuclear safety were a major contributing factor. Additionally, various member of the U.S. Congress were concerned about Vietnam’s lack of human rights and fears of acquiring such technology—all factors contributing to slowing bilateral cooperation on nuclear energy. While such concerns certainly have merit, Vietnam had already signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and had become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Hanoi has also promised not to engage in enriching uranium. The U.S. government fears that prolonged talks with Vietnam will deprive U.S. firms of business opportunities in this field—a field that consists of competitors such as Canada, China, France, Japan, South Korea, and Russia.

If and when the Vietnamese government becomes ready to resume nuclear-energy development, Japan and the United States may well coordinate their policies in assisting Vietnam’s civilian nuclear program.

**Prospects for Trilateral Economic Cooperation**

In 2013, Japan and Vietnam celebrated the 40\(^{\text{th}}\) anniversary of their diplomatic ties. The United States and Vietnam will celebrate the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) anniversary of their diplomatic relations this year. Both nations have had

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11 Murray Hiebert, _et al., A New Era in U.S.-Vietnam Relations; Deepening Ties Two Decades after Normalization_, Washington, DC, CSIS, 2014, p.35.

different types of relations and interactions with Vietnam during this period. Their mutual contacts have deepened the trilateral interdependency among the three countries, although it is not a balanced interdependency.

The Ghost of the Vietnam War

Since the end of the Vietnam War, a united Vietnam has built closer economic ties with Japan than with the United States. Japan has traded, invested, and “ODAed” with Vietnam more heavily than has the United States. This is mainly due to the history of conflict between the United States and Vietnam.

In terms of trilateral cooperation, one could say that Japan has been an integral strategic part of Vietnam’s economic development—particularly for its infrastructure development—compensating for the United States’ inability to play a larger role, due to strained relations between Washington and Hanoi. Several war-related issues—such as American soldiers MIA, Agent Orange, unexploded ordnance and land mines, and Vietnamese refugees who have settled in the United States demonstrating their hostility toward the rapprochement between Vietnam and America—have contributed to this tension.

Now that Washington and Hanoi have settled many wartime difficulties, overall ties between the three nations are likely to improve. It is time to reflect on how these countries can build their mutual relations, complementing each other’s interests in various strategic domains.

A Bright Future for U.S.-Vietnamese Relations

In the future, Vietnam may find the American market more attractive than the Japanese one, simply because it is larger than Japan’s. The United States has a great advantage in that English, which is quickly becoming popular in Vietnam, can facilitate communications with the Vietnamese. It also has a large group of Vietnamese Americans, who number 1.55 million people, according to the 2010 census. The group, which is the fourth-largest Asian ethnic group in the United States, has what one might consider “bridge-building ambassadors” who can serve as bridge builders between American and Vietnamese societies and who can exert influence on U.S. policies toward Vietnam.
Japan’s Important Role

Conversely, Japan has a relative advantage over the United States in terms of geographic proximity. Japan can continue to promote trade, investment, and ODA for Vietnam without worrying about the legacy of the Vietnam War. While Japan and the United States occasionally voice their concerns on issues like inefficient bureaucracy, corruption, and violation of intellectual property rights, Japan should encourage the United States to treat issues sensitive to Vietnam, like human rights, political and religious freedom, and workers’ rights, in a more cautious manner.

Conclusion

U.S.-Japanese-Vietnamese trilateral cooperation is indeed an important part of all three nations’ strategic agendas. Economic cooperation should be based on political and strategic cooperation. Today, all three nations share similar perceptions of China’s growing naval and non-naval maritime power in the South China Sea. There is no competition between Japan and the United States in seeking access to the Vietnamese market. The TPP is an essential means for all three nations to come together even more closely, although it is a step toward an eventual Asia-Pacific–wide economic integration by merging the TPP with an Asia-based Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Recommendations

1. Japan, the United States, and Vietnam should consider forming an intergovernmental committee at the ministerial level to discuss ways of strengthening economic interdependency in the areas of trade and investment.

2. Tokyo and Washington should help fortify Hanoi’s economic base through trade, investment, and ODA so that it can resist China’s efforts to weaken its economy through coercive means now and in the future.

3. Japan and the United States should settle their TPP negotiations at the earliest opportunity so that they can exert a positive impact on the remaining negotiations. Recognizing that joining any FTA is at the expense of substantial adjustment costs, Tokyo and Washington should also offer economic and technical support for Vietnam’s transition process.
4. America should encourage Japan to improve its foreign direct investment environment.

5. Tokyo should urge Washington to treat Hanoi as a market economy, rather than a nonmarket economy.

6. Both Japan and the United States should call on Vietnam to modernize its bureaucracy and speed up paperwork regarding trade, investment, and ODA.

7. Tokyo and Washington should coordinate their approaches to supporting Mekong Delta development, as well as Hanoi’s civilian nuclear program with respect to training nuclear specialists.
Growing Maritime Security Concerns in Southeast Asia: A Greater Need for Further Regional Cooperation

By Hoang Anh Tuan & Nguyen Vu Tung

Cooperation between Japan, the United States, and Vietnam has been improving dramatically over the last several years—a reflection of both the changing strategic environment in the region, as well as a deepening sense of trust among the three countries.

Recent events—especially when one examines specific instances of warming bilateral ties with Vietnam—demonstrate how far relations have come. For example, during U.S. secretary of defense Ashton Carter’s recent visit to Vietnam from May 31 to June 1, 2015, he and his Vietnamese counterpart, Gen. Phung Quang Thanh, signed a Joint Vision Statement on Defense Relations—a remarkable development in the defense ties between the two nations, as relations were only normalized just twenty years ago. In the case of Japan, Vietnamese-Japanese defense cooperation has also moved in a similar direction since the two countries upgraded their limited strategic partnership to an extensive strategic partnership in June 2014. All of this comes on the heels of increased defense ties between the United States and Japan, who just announced updated Guidelines for Defense Cooperation with the possibility of joint naval and air patrols in the South China Sea—a development of considerable interest to Vietnam.

Growing Maritime Security Concerns in the South China Sea

Since ancient times, life-sustaining goods and services have traveled by sea. The sea is also a source of prosperity and advancement—the quickest and in many ways easiest means for commercial and political intercourse among different ethnic and political groups. The often-discussed “Sea Lines of Communication” (SLOCs) are more than just shipping routes. They also represent access to the renewable resources of the sea—bountiful fishing stocks and natural resources that can be extracted from the seabed.

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Today we remain as dependent on free and open access to the sea for security and prosperity as we did centuries ago. Various statistics only underline this fact. Consider, for example:

- Today 95 percent of international communications travel via underwater cable.
- Twenty-one of the world's twenty-eight mega-cities are within 62 miles or roughly 100km of the sea.
- 49 percent of the world's oil travels through seven major sea chokepoints.
- 50 percent of the world's population lives within 62 miles, or roughly 100km, of a coast.
- 23,000 ships are underway daily in SLOCs carrying 95 percent of the world's commerce by sea. The South China Sea represents half of the globe's sea tonnage and one-third of its total monetary value.

Indeed, threats to the security of such important SLOCs come in various types: competition for resources; natural disasters; social unrest; hostile cyber activity; piracy; violent extremism (criminal, terrorist, and religious); regional conflict; proliferations of weapons of mass destruction; and natural hazard.

**Many Different Parties, Many Different Claims in the South China Sea**

In recent years, growing political-military tension over various territorial claims in the South China Sea has become a major source of security concern with threats to peace and security, as well as both safety and freedom of navigation. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea involve six different parties, including Brunei, China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan. Currently, disputes in the South China Sea span three different and distinct levels, which include:

- Bilateral territorial disputes, such as disagreements between Vietnam and China over the Paracel Islands and between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah;
- Larger regional disputes involving the six parties listed above—China, Taiwan, and the four ASEAN nations—over the Spratly Islands; and
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- International challenges and disputes involving many different nations that span the globe who have interests in the South China Sea besides the six parties listed prior, like the United States, Japan, Australia, and the EU nations, just to mention a few.

China’s South China Sea Claims: Driving Regional Tensions

China is at the center of tensions in the South China Sea for a variety of reasons. First, Beijing’s excessive claims are based on the often-discussed nine-dash-line map, which accounts for nearly 90 percent of the South China Sea, dating back to the Kuo Min Tang era. However, China has never had effective administrative management of the areas within the nine-dash line.

Secondly, Beijing’s claims are backed by powerful coast guards and naval forces that aim to drive rival claimants out of the disputed area. For example, China’s coast guard has more ships than the coast guards of Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam combined.

Thirdly, unlike other claimants, China has the power, determination, and ambition to dominate and then control the South China Sea and has been quickly and assertively trying to make such goals a reality. Recent examples include China’s taking control of Scarborough from the Philippines, placing a giant floating oil rig in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, and unilaterally introducing annual fishing bans in the South China Sea. Beijing’s massive land-reclamation efforts to turn the uninhabited rocks and islands of the South China Sea into inhabited entities are a prime example. For roughly the past eighteen months, China has reclaimed more than 800 hectares of land. In addition, Beijing has never been serious about materializing its commitment to conclude the negotiations with ASEAN on the DOC and COC, all the while driving a wedge between claimants and nonclaimants in ASEAN, thus weakening ASEAN’s collective posture on the disputes in the South China Sea.

Fourthly, what has caused nations around the region to become increasingly concerned is that Beijing has never been transparent about the future use of these new islands. Such islands could serve both civilian and military purposes if China wanted to exert pressure on those whom it assumes pose threats to its security or its more-broadly-defined national interests.

As regional tensions continue to grow—thanks to China’s actions listed above—the situation has become even more complex, as the United States intensifies efforts to stop Beijing’s reclamation efforts. Speaking in Hawaii
before attending the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Secretary Carter offered a stern warning to China: “There should be no mistakes: the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever the international law allows, as we do all around the world.” However, Beijing has not shown any signs of changing its behavior. Admiral Sun Jianguo, the deputy chief of the General Staff Department of the PLA, stated China’s position: “Constructions fall well within the scope of China’s sovereignty and are justified, legitimate and reasonable…”

Could Tensions in the South China Sea Spill Into Conflict?

Countries around the region are deeply concerned over growing tensions in the South China Sea. As various parties enhance their military capabilities and intensify their presences at sea, and nationalist sentiments in the region increase—from Japan to the Philippines, South Korea, and even China and Vietnam—a minor incident could easily occur, pushing the region to the brink of a major war. The ramifications for the Asia-Pacific and perhaps the wider Indo-Pacific region could be severe; a major war today could easily rival or surpass conflicts in the past, such as the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

Considering the Stakes, Greater Cooperation on Maritime Security Is Vital

In the context of growing tensions between China and the United States, as well as among claimants of disputed islands and reefs in the South China Sea, there is an urgent need to boost cooperation on defense and maritime security issues among the various parties involved and other nations that have clear national interests in the region. Clearly there is room for the United States, Japan, and Vietnam to work together on these issues. However, it should be noted that regional maritime cooperation is now mainly based on bilateral initiatives, with less focus on trilateral or region-wide initiatives.

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Growing Maritime Security Concerns in Southeast Asia: A Greater Need for Further Regional Cooperation

U.S.-Japanese Maritime and Defense Cooperation

Among bilateral security alliances in the region, the U.S.-Japan alliance is the most influential and long lasting. This alliance is pivotal not only for the U.S. “rebalance” to East Asia, but also for each country’s respective security, as well as securing freedom of navigation. After two years of negotiations, Japan and the United States announced updated Guidelines for Defense Cooperation on April 26, 2015. The most important aspect of the updated Guidelines is that Japan—for the first time since the end of World War II—is not bound by geographical constraints and can jointly work with the United States to respond to security concerns that directly affect Tokyo’s security beyond Japanese territory and the surrounding area. In terms of specifics, how Japan and the United States are to cooperate with each other in various situations has not been explained in detail—leaving room for speculation that Japan can either independently or jointly patrol with U.S. air surveillance or naval forces in the South China Sea.

U.S.-Vietnamese Maritime and Defense Cooperation

Maritime cooperation is an increasingly important aspect of larger U.S.-Vietnamese defense cooperation. In September 2011, the United States and Vietnam signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Advancing Bilateral Defense, with defense cooperation quickly growing thereafter. During a meeting with Vietnamese foreign minister Pham Binh Minh, U.S. secretary of state John Kerry made the following remark concerning U.S.-Vietnamese relations: “I can’t think of two countries that have worked harder, done more, and done better to try to bring themselves together and change history and change the future . . .”

The U.S.-Vietnam Defense MOU referenced above incorporates five key areas, which include: maritime security cooperation and initiatives; high-level defense dialogues; search and rescue programs and initiatives; humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief initiatives; and UN peacekeeping operation initiatives. Overall, there has been a dramatic improvement in all five areas of defense cooperation. For example, in the Search and Rescue Programs and Initiatives, the United States and Vietnam collaborated on the search for Malaysia Airlines Flight MH 370. Also, in the realm of UN peacekeeping initiatives, the United States helped Vietnam construct a $3.1 million training

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facility and provide training equipment for engineers and a level-two medical hospital.

As part of the 20th anniversary of normalization of U.S.-Vietnamese relations, Secretary Carter signed the Joint Vision Statement with his Vietnamese counterpart, Gen. Phung Quang Thanh. The most crucial component of the statement is the possibility of co-production of weapons and defense supplies, which would help Hanoi become more independent in satisfying its defense needs. Secretary Carter also committed to provide Vietnam with $18 million to buy two U.S. Metal Shark Defiant patrol boats, further helping Vietnam to improve its coast-guard capacity.

The catalysts for U.S.-Vietnamese defense cooperation can be described as follows:

- Defense cooperation is an integral component of the entire relationship between the United States and Vietnam, and it has proceeded on par with the improvement in the U.S.-Vietnamese relationship under the framework of comprehensive partnership both sides agreed to in July 2013.

- The United States and Vietnam have shared views and interests in a number of key bilateral, regional, and global issues. Bilaterally, the United States supports a strong, independent, and prosperous Vietnam and also respects Hanoi’s territorial integrity, while playing an active role in the Asia-Pacific. At the regional level, the United States wishes Vietnam to play an important role in strengthening and consolidating a united, strong, and prosperous ASEAN. At the global level, the United States and Vietnam closely cooperate on issues such as peacekeeping, antiterrorism, climate change, and nonproliferation.

- The United States is one of the strongest supporters of Vietnam’s position on the South China Sea question, demanding no use of force and urging the parties concerned to manage disputes in a peaceful manner and in accordance with international law, as well as in line with ASEAN’s norms and rules of behavior.

*Vietnamese-Japanese Maritime and Defense Cooperation*

In March 2015, Vietnamese president Truong Tan Sang and Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe signed the Extensive Strategic Partnership Agreement, which elevated their eight-year-old strategic partnership. It is important to note that during a meeting with Mr. Truong Tan Sang, Mr. Abe stated that Japan was willing to assist Vietnam in enhancing Hanoi’s capacity in maritime
Growing Maritime Security Concerns in Southeast Asia: A Greater Need for Further Regional Cooperation

law enforcement. Earlier, during a visit to Hanoi on August 1, 2014, Japanese foreign minister Fumio Kishida announced that Tokyo would provide Hanoi with six vessels to boost its capacity for maritime security.

At the same time, Japan’s Diet was also considering giving Vietnam Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in the form of new patrol boats for its maritime enforcement agencies. Also, during a recent meeting with Vietnamese vice president Nguyen Thi Doan at the sidelines of the UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Japan, Foreign Minister Kishida stated that Japan wanted to work with Vietnam to tackle maritime-security challenges, along with other important issues.

There are several possible explanations for Japan’s interest in improving maritime-security cooperation with Vietnam:

- Vietnam and Japan have no disputes when it comes to economic, security, or human-rights issues. Furthermore, Hanoi considers Tokyo one of its most trusted strategic partners. As a leading foreign investor, ODA donor, important source of foreign direct investment (FDI), and lucrative market for Vietnamese exports, Japan is seen as a pivotal partner in helping Vietnam with economic development, future prosperity, and its overall national defense.

- Japan also has territorial disputes with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands—seeing the connected nature between the maritime security of the East and South China Seas. Japan is a littoral state heavily dependent on the safety of SLOCs in East Asia; its economy and security would be impacted dramatically if tensions were to rise. Therefore, Japan sees a need to enhance cooperation with littoral states in East Asia to safeguard freedom of navigation and maritime security in the South China Sea. Vietnam’s maritime-security cooperation with Japan should be viewed in the much wider context of Japan’s recognition of ASEAN’s role in the region and Japan’s growing maritime-security cooperation with ASEAN, and also as an integral part of the overall Vietnamese-Japanese relationship.

Recommendations

While a path for trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and Vietnam is not clearly paved in the short term, the current level of bilateral consultation and cooperation among these nations should continue, particularly between Vietnam and the United States and between Vietnam
and Japan. Such bilateral cooperation could very well play an active role in growing a strong trilateral relationship over the medium-to-long term.

However, it should be noted that the U.S.-Japan alliance plays a key role not only in the maintenance of maritime security in the entire region, but also in the trilateral relationship. Indeed, Vietnam and countries in the region expect the following contributions from the U.S.-Japan alliance:

- The alliance must be strong enough to deter and repel security threats to the United States, Japan, and important regional public goods. Furthermore, the alliance must be able to ensure maritime security and maritime safety for the entire region and be viable enough to prevent any nation that threatens the use of force or uses force from altering the territorial status quo in the region;

- The U.S.-Japan alliance should contribute to regional peace and stability, consolidate the central role played by ASEAN in the region, as well as promote prosperity in Vietnam and the entire region—a condition necessary for the promotion of peace and stability in the region over the long term;

- The U.S.-Japan alliance should make it known to countries in the region, especially China, that the use of force or threats of the use of force to back up territorial claims will simply be ineffective, and costs will be imposed on those who would destabilize the region by so doing;

- The alliance should help strengthen existing security institutions in the region and build regional structures strong and inclusive enough to neutralize or thwart security challenges to the region, whether they are traditional or nontraditional;

- There should be an expansion of the U.S.-Japan security alliance to incorporate a third party in policy discussions and coordination, information sharing, and so on; some prime examples of such cooperation are the U.S.-Japan-Australia Dialogue and the U.S.-Japan-India Dialogue. In the future, the United States and Japan should consider the creation of a dialogue mechanism, such as one that involves the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and even China, with the U.S.-Japan alliance serving as the core;

- Finally, the alliance should proactively engage Beijing so as to ensure friendly relations with China and encourage China to act more responsibly and use peaceful means to resolve territorial disputes with its neighboring
countries, in hopes of getting Beijing to actively contribute to peace, stability, and cooperation in the region and the rest of the world.
China’s East China Sea ADIZ Gamble: Past, Present, and South China Sea Future?

By Harry J. Kazianis

Introduction

“Aggressive,” “coercive,” “antagonistic,” and “hostile” are some of the words various Asia-security experts have used over the last several years to describe recent Chinese foreign-policy choices. Such talk heated up dramatically in November 2013 when China declared—with no official advanced warning—an Air-Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, a geographic flashpoint between various powers in the region. This unilateral action sparked intense global debate as to the logic of such a move, but also amplified larger concerns over Chinese intentions throughout the Asia-Pacific and wider Indo-Pacific regions.

This essay, divided into several sections, offers a rationale for China’s ADIZ declaration, with an eye towards an even more important question: Will Beijing declare such a zone in the area of the South China Sea? This author believes China’s recent island-reclamation projects are an effort to create the core infrastructure for the declaration and enforcement of such a zone within the next several years. Unless serious action is undertaken to change Beijing’s calculus for creating such zones—utilizing confidence-building measures to change the core of its geostrategic thinking, along with strategies that will challenge such island reclamations—a Chinese ADIZ in the South China Sea is a near certainty.

There are various prospective motivations behind Beijing’s 2013 ADIZ declaration that are worthy of consideration—the rise of a great power acting in its own self-interest, a deeply rooted sense of historical wrongdoing at the hands of stronger nations in the past, combined with an attempt to shield itself from future actions, as well as nationalistic motives. While all of these explanations lie well within the realm of possibilities, this analysis will explore an equally if not more plausible rationale: China’s 2013 declaration and

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possible moves towards an ADIZ in the South China Sea should be seen as part of a series of actions that are rooted in an effort to push U.S. and allied forces away from Chinese “near seas” and areas of “core interest,” while at the same time attempting to negate operational concepts like the much-debated but often-misunderstood Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept and associated weapons platforms that could challenge China’s growing antiaccess/area-denial capabilities (A2/AD).

This analysis will then conclude with recommendations on how a joint U.S.-Japan-Vietnam trilateral approach could impact Beijing’s decision making on a South China Sea ADIZ, utilizing a two-tier approach of incentives and deterring strategies to negate the foundations of any future ADIZ.

China’s ADIZ and Air-Sea Battle: A Reaction to a Reaction?2

On November 23, 2013, China declared an ADIZ, rattling nerves across Asia and around the world. While many nations, including the United States, have declared ADIZs in the past, Beijing’s announcement warrants special consideration. The new zone covers a large expanse of the East China Sea—a critical waterway and airspace traversed by many of the Asia-Pacific’s most powerful nations, but also many countries from around the globe. Competing territorial claims in this area by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan complicate this matter even further.

Beijing’s East China Sea ADIZ: Why Take Such a Step?

Why would Beijing declare such an ADIZ, knowing that it would inflame regional tensions? One possible explanation for the move was that it was a response to Japan’s “nationalization” of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. While this is certainly a strong possibility, there are deeper motives likely at play beyond Beijing and Tokyo’s long-standing dispute. China’s actions were clearly part of a long-term effort to monitor and restrict foreign military activity in what it describes as its “near seas.” As Peter Mattis explained in the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief, the rollout of the new zone displayed no signs of crisis language, but instead appeared to be the result of a careful policy process—to neutralize the United States’ and possibly others’

efforts to ensure access to the East China Sea; these efforts are themselves a reaction to previous Chinese actions in the recent past.³

Beijing’s 2013 ADIZ belongs not only to the context of China’s territorial disputes, but also to an escalating disagreement with the United States over operations in the near seas. It provides a legal framework for China’s complaints about U.S. intelligence-gathering flights near China’s borders, and for radar tracking and harassment of aircraft that fail to report flight plans to Chinese authorities.

**Enter the ASB Operational Concept: Pushing China towards an ADIZ?**

Considering Chinese concerns as noted above, Beijing feels its ADIZ effort is necessary for resisting growing threats from the U.S. military against the integrity of Chinese borders. Chinese fears over the U.S. ASB operational concept only reinforce these concerns; Chinese analysis highlights ASB as proof of the threat of possible U.S. military intervention in China’s interests.

ASB, now renamed by the Pentagon the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), is itself a reaction to Chinese efforts to develop A2/AD capabilities, suggesting that Chinese and U.S. military planners are already engaged in a conceptual arms race to produce frameworks for controlling access to the near seas. Here we can see a clear reaction cycle and/or security dilemma that is highly disturbing: China, out of a need to protect its core interests and near seas, develops a potent A2/AD capability. The United States then develops ASB to counter this capability. Beijing, seeing the development of ASB, then begins deploying an ADIZ in the East China Sea in another attempt to push U.S. forces back and regulate its near seas and airspace.

While China’s military capabilities are growing, they pale in comparison to those of the United States in terms of command and control (C2), communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities, deployable forces across all possible domains of conflict, overall training, sheer technological edge, and deployability around the globe. To negate such capabilities, Beijing has developed a strategic posture that places its forces in a position to wage an asymmetric struggle.

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx tetnews%5Btt_news%5D=41719&cHash=bc62ee7405484e553573b1d002184b1#.VXMwuflViko.
PLA forces would utilize A2/AD tactics and strategies in an attempt to exact vicious losses using ballistic and cruise missiles, ultra-quiet conventional submarines, advanced mines, possibly UAVs, and other weapons that are sophisticated and increasingly home-grown to keep U.S. and allied forces away from China’s near seas. Beijing sees strategic suicide in allowing a larger power the military advantage of building up forces in and around its near seas and striking in mass. Halting or deterring such a buildup through an A2/AD strategy—with various Chinese scholars arguing for massive preemptive strikes if conflict seemed certain—seems like the best approach, should a conflict ever occur.

**Why the United States Developed ASB**

In response to growing A2/AD challenges around the world—and with a clear focus on China’s and Iran’s growing A2/AD capabilities—the United States developed the operational concept of Air-Sea Battle. Holding a similar title to the 1980s NATO concept of AirLand Battle, ASB in very broad terms seeks to create a higher level of “jointness” between American air and sea power to overcome the challenges of A2/AD environments.

**Battling Misconceptions**

Since the ASB concept was first revealed in various formats in 2009/2010, the concept has proven controversial—mainly thanks to a detailed analysis by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), a prominent Washington think tank that in 2010 laid out a scenario in which ASB would be used in a war with China to strike targets on the mainland, an analysis that was not endorsed by the Pentagon.4

However, the concept has been embraced by the Department of Defense (DoD) and evolved dramatically since the 2010 CSBA ASB report. ASB was reworked, differing substantially in tone, as well as in substance from the CSBA ASB concept. This new version of ASB, in order to avoid any lingering confusion, was treated to multiple official DoD briefings and explanations. Most Pentagon officials this author has spoken with over the last several years have explained ASB as a necessary aspect of America’s reconceptualization of how its armed forces will need to counter antiaccess

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challenges in a post-“war on terror” world and not as a strategy to fight a war against China, as many in the media have portrayed the concept.

At a 2013 House Armed Services Committee Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee hearing, Rear Admiral James G. Foggo defined the concept in an effort to put growing confusion to rest:

“(ASB) is designed to assure access to parts of the “global commons”—those areas of the air, sea, cyberspace and space that no one “owns,” but which we all depend on—such as the sea lines of communication. Our adversaries’ anti-access/area denial strategies employ a range of military capabilities that impede the free use of these ungoverned spaces. These military capabilities include new generations of cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles with improved range, accuracy, and lethality [which] are being produced and proliferated...Accordingly the Air-Sea Battle Concept is intended to defeat such threats to access.”^{5}

**ASB Evolves: Enter JAM-GC**

Over the last five or so years, the ASB concept has been tested in various wargames and integrated into Pentagon planning for usage in contested operating environments—with both China and Iran being the primary challenges. However, at the end of 2014, rumors began to surface that important changes to the operating concept were being made, with specific consideration given to making the concept truly joint and integrating all U.S. military branches to ensure the concept would truly be “cross-domain” and not just a U.S. Navy and Air Force project. In an article for *The National Interest*, experts from the Air-Sea Battle Office at the Pentagon laid out a vision for what Air-Sea Battle will become:

“An updated supporting joint concept will also describe an evolutionary approach to joint and allied operations across service, component and multinational lines in A2/AD environments. Building on existing JOAC precepts, the refined concept will incorporate the most useful ideas from the existing “ASB Concept” to include a force that is networked, fully integrated, and capable of cross-domain attack and defense in depth by U.S., allied and coalition forces in the global commons...

...Based on recent assessments, current doctrinal command-and-control methodologies will likely be inadequate to address A2/AD environments where beyond-line-of-sight communications and other connectivity between units can be disrupted or denied by an adversary. Therefore, evolutionary modifications to command-and-control structures and

protocols are necessary in order to effectively command and control Joint Forces in a heavily disrupted electromagnetic-spectrum environment. Additionally, cross-domain expertise within component and lower-echelon operations centers must be leveraged to create cross-domain effects in support of the commanders’ intent and schemes of maneuver.6

What Does Beijing Think of Changes to ASB?

While there has been little to no scholarly literature articulating a Chinese position on JAM-GC in open-source texts, there is every reason to believe China would see this as nothing more than an evolutionary upgrade to the ASB concept—with the above text indicating as such—and an even greater threat.7

Over the last eighteen months, we have seen Beijing make various attempts to strengthen its A2/AD platforms and defensive systems in areas that would negate ASB. For example, recent sleuthing of Chinese open-source material has revealed preliminary efforts to develop sonar nets in the Yellow, East and South China Seas, something that would target the very heart of ASB: U.S. Navy attack submarines.8 China also still has an active interest in Russian military technology, with recently confirmed purchases of the S-400 air-defense platform, as well as continued interest in the Su-35 fighter, Russian airplane engines, and ultra-quiet submarines and technology—all items that would greatly enhance Beijing’s A2/AD capabilities.


7 Please note while ASB has officially become JAM-GC, for the purposes of consistency, the author will continue to use ASB throughout this text, as this is the more popular term used.

Recommendations

Clearly the United States, Japan, and Vietnam have a shared interest in deterring China from not only declaring a new ADIZ in the South China Sea—an area through which over $5.3 trillion in seaborne trade passes every year—but also enforcing such a zone. Here, there is a clear opportunity for a trilateral approach to shift Beijing’s calculus in terms of creating such a zone. Such a strategy must make halting or at least dramatically slowing the foundations of any Chinese South China Sea ADIZ project an absolute priority—growing island-reclamation projects. The reason for this is obvious: If China were to deploy aircraft, coast-guard vessels, warships, radar stations, and various other platforms on multiple islands across the South China Sea, Beijing would have the tools necessary to declare and enforce a new ADIZ. While there are many different approaches that are certainly possible, they must be balanced with a clear effort to ensure tensions in the area of the South China Sea are not enflamed even more. The three below—utilizing the classic “carrot and stick approach”—should merit strong consideration. Such recommendations could be attempted as part of a complete strategy or utilized selectively with different levels of intensity on a case by case basis as needed:

1. **Work to Negate the Growing A2/AD vs. ASB Security Dilemma:** At the recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Chinese admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), explained that “[t]he Chinese government and military never said they were going to establish an ADIZ in the South China Sea” and that the creation of such a zone would be based on Beijing’s view of the security situation in the area—a line that has now been repeated almost word for word by multiple Chinese officials recently. The United States, along with the support of Japan and Vietnam, should test such declarations.

One possible method for doing this would be to look for ways in which Washington and Beijing can halt the deployment of weapons platforms

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that only engrain what is quickly becoming a high-tech security dilemma by those who wish to retain access to areas like the East and South China Sea (the United States and its partners) and those who wish to restrict access to such near seas (China). The United States, with the support of Japan and Vietnam, should propose that Washington and Beijing limit the deployment of selected future types of next-generation weapons platforms that could greatly enhance their competing A2/AD and ASB strike systems—an effort to break the reactionary cycle of events. For example, considering the lethal nature and game-changing capabilities of hypersonic weapons, this could be one area where both sides could work to halt such deployments to the Asia-Pacific region. Such an agreement could go a long way to “freeze” the A2/AD and ASB security dilemma where it is when other types of next-generation weapons and defensive systems seem ripe for deployment. This could (at least in theory) show China that a new ADIZ in the South China Sea would be unneeded, as the United States and its partners are actively making good-faith efforts to address its security concerns and working to break this growing security dilemma.

2. **Time for “Shamefare”:** While Washington and its partners must reach out to Beijing in an effort to ease its security concerns, they should expose to the world any increased efforts to enhance its island-reclamation projects in the South China Sea—the foundation of any new ADIZ in the region.

   CNN’s recent reporting in the South China Sea—providing clear video and pictures of Chinese island-reclamation projects—and reports and satellite images provided by CSIS’ Asia Maritime Project are excellent examples of what Washington, along with Japan and Vietnam, should be doing on a regular basis. They must set out to win the media narrative and define Beijing’s motives for reclamation projects in the South China Sea—projects that would be the life blood of a new ADIZ. While it seems unlikely that Washington and its partners and allies will be able to force Beijing to scale back its present island-reclamation projects, they can ensure the world is aware of every move Beijing makes—making China think twice about reclaiming any new islands and hence limiting the ease with which Beijing can declare a new ADIZ. Here are some examples of how what this author calls “shamefare” could work in practice:

   A: When China takes any new action to expand its capabilities in the South China Sea—like constructing a new runway that could be used to patrol the area or installing sophisticated military hardware
like antiship weapons systems—photos and video should be distributed to the media immediately.

B: If U.S., Japanese, or Vietnamese vessels exercising freedom of navigation come under Chinese harassment in the South China Sea, the incident should be captured on video and placed on YouTube and other prominent social-media channels immediately.

“Shaming” China repeatedly for its actions will allow America and its partners to win the battle of competing narratives and put Beijing on the defensive. China would be left having to constantly explain its actions time and time again. America and its partners should use these tactics to their advantage.

3. Time for Increased “Lawfare”: The United States, along with Japan and Vietnam, should work with all other claimants in the South China Sea to settle any disputes in the region that do not involve China. While clearly not an easy task, Beijing’s growing mastery of the region through growing island-reclamation projects could spur these parties to reach an accommodation. With this achieved, all parties that have claims against China could file their own legal complaints jointly in international courts.

While “lawfare” will likely not evoke a formal challenge from Beijing beyond its standard claims of “indisputable sovereignty,” as is the case with the Philippines’ lawsuit, a much larger filing by a united front of nations would certainly constitute a stronger action.11 Washington by design would take no official stance, but it could certainly work “unofficially” to spur such actions while actively offering words of encouragement and intentionally pushing Beijing to settle such disputes with its neighbors in a multilateral setting. Even a flood of separate lawsuits by each claimant, filed simultaneously for maximum impact, could leave Beijing scrambling—stuck in a public-relations nightmare it wouldn’t be able to easily dismiss. Such actions could deter China from reclaiming any more islands or reefs and also, by default, from setting up a new ADIZ.

Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief: Disaster Response Operations, Resilience, and Regional Stability

By Wallace C. Gregson

At 0440 Philippine time on November 8, 2013, Typhoon Haiyan—known locally as Yolanda—made landfall in the Philippines. It was one of the strongest typhoons on record to make landfall. It struck the central Visayas region and continued on to Leyte, Cebu, and Panay, hitting a total of six provinces and affecting over eleven million people. About four million people were displaced, over six thousand were initially reported as killed, and nearly six million required emergency food aid.

The Philippine government and local governments in the affected areas were unable to respond. Transportation and communication infrastructure was destroyed in the storm. Without immediate aid, the death toll rose to catastrophic levels.

Japan and the United States: Answering the Call

Japan and the United States were the earliest responders in the most critical early hours after the storm passed. The expertise of aid-giving agencies and nongovernmental organizations is helpful, but the unique capabilities of the Self-Defense Force and the U.S. forces stationed in Japan brought the needed organizational capabilities, including communications, logistics, airfield- and port-opening capabilities, reconnaissance means to find distressed areas and people, vertical-landing aircraft to deliver aid where the infrastructure was destroyed, and embedded medical care. U.S. and Japanese ships played a very valuable role. They allowed both nations to keep their operating base at sea and avoid the congested land areas where other organizations and agencies were exploiting the available dry land for their operations. U.S. amphibious ships even carried infant diapers. Diapers were a

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small but critical item that provided comfort for the young mothers caught in the disaster.

A Fast Response

Perhaps most critical was the attitude displayed in Tokyo and Washington. We did not wait to clarify the situation before acting. We had a bias toward forward movement and response, relying on the early arrivals to assess the most critical needs and to act immediately.

The response provided a valuable example to the greater region. Japan and the United States quickly responded with a major military movement in the absence of complete information, coordinating activities as we moved to the objective area. Our ability to operate together seamlessly was on display. More importantly, those members of the force that were ashore and in direct contact displayed the high virtues of well-trained forces, tirelessly caring for the homeless, the sick, and the helpless, protecting the innocent from the ravages of nature and from the predation of those who would take callow advantage of the distressed for their own gain.

A short while after, the Philippine ambassador to Japan had occasion to present a speech in Tokyo to a gathering sponsored by an aid agency, Peace Winds America. In that speech to American and Japanese officials and donors present, the ambassador specifically and intentionally called Japan an ally—a powerful operation indeed.

The Asia-Pacific: A Tortured Land

Lessons from Typhoon Haiyan

As is well known, Asia is the reluctant host to more than the region’s fair share of earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, typhoons, pandemic diseases, and volcanoes. The region’s nations who are willing to cooperate and come to the aid of neighbors in need provide a major stabilizing influence and contribute to the expansion of stability and prosperity.

As with any operation, government, military, medical, and nongovernmental agency, professionals will examine the details of the Typhoon Haiyan response and make corrections in many areas in anticipation of future events. But the major lesson is clear: Our ability and willingness to come to the aid of a neighbor trying to recover from a disaster (especially in the very early stages) is a necessary and effective way to enhance our capability to be a
productive member of the Asian community of nations. Trust and habits of cooperation develop under pressure in these disaster-response operations that prove vital in other affairs of state.

The Infectious-Disease Challenge

There is another set of requirements that should be part of the regional activities of the U.S.-Japan alliance in cooperation with Vietnam—the building of resilience in the face of likely threats. The physical threats of earthquake, flood, tsunami, and others can be better managed through construction of barriers and such. The threats to health will require much more work in the areas of both prevention and response.

This threat of disease introduces a new level of complexity, that of a fast-spreading infectious illness that threatens national and even regional stability. The danger of contagion complicates all the usual functions of a disaster-response effort.

Asia is home to many diseases with pandemic potential, and the recent West African Ebola outbreak showed just how damaging such an event can be. Building resilience to these pandemic threats is far more about building habits of cooperation and education.

Within the Asian region, we see countries where economic and political difficulties challenge the established order internally and in the region; where domestic crises threaten the region’s progress toward stable political cooperation; where historical mistrust and territorial disputes remain unresolved; where unrestrained population flows, displaced persons, crime, and corruption inhibit regional confidence, undermine democratic values, and lessen common security. A disease outbreak in these conditions can quickly destroy stability.

Responding to the Infectious Disease Challenge

To meet this threat, our forces and national institutions must do more than simply wait for something to happen. A broader, more constructive role is needed. An active and productive presence in this theater devoted to health security will not only help prevent such an outbreak, it will also help promote security, dampen sources of instability, deter conflict, give substance to security commitments, and ensure continued access to the region. Through active presence, we can help decrease the disease threat and help shape the regional geopolitical climate.
Within this broad, active presence, no activity is more profound than “Medical Diplomacy” work. An International Health Engagement effort, especially if it is built upon the U.S.-Japan alliance, with Vietnam as the ASEAN lead, builds capacity with our allies, friends, and international organizations. It improves health and resilience across the region and establishes cooperative surveillance networks to enable early warning.

At present, this includes (among other things) the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s “Pacific Partnership” and Pacific Air Force’s “Pacific Angel.” Additionally, the medical, dental, and veterinary work that accompanies every deployment for exercise in another country should be exploited. This should continue to be expanded to include allies and partners. Integral to this are education and training efforts with our friends to build relationships and develop capability. Through this, we hope to speed up recovery time and create more resilience to threats.

Battling a Common Foe: How a Joint Approach Could Help

Opportunity for regional expansion and integration in the face of a common threat beckons. Vietnam’s formal and informal leadership role within ASEAN provides a great advantage. U.S. and Japanese cooperation within Pacific Partnership can and should be expanded with participation from willing ASEAN nations, beginning with Vietnam. Once this precedent is established, Vietnam can then lead an expansion of this effort into the rest of ASEAN, South Asia, and greater Oceania.

This expanded participation can greatly increase the mission’s degree of coverage and help bridge cultural, linguistic, and national challenges. It will accelerate the professional advancement of participating individual members through collaborative practice of their specialties and embedded education and training efforts.

A U.S. Hospital Ship is the centerpiece of Pacific Partnership. With an increase in participation, additional sea-based platforms from the United States and other nations can be made available by adding other vessels and connecting them within a communications and logistics network, including embedded and attached aviation elements. For one example, Taiwan’s newest navy vessel brings a full surgical suite and offers a number of well-equipped hospital beds in a series of modern wards, including isolation and quarantine capability. Finally, through the creation of more partners, more continuous surveillance capability can be established across the region to enable more accurate and prompt notification of infectious-disease emergence. With this
enhanced and timely warning, collaborative and cooperative action across the region, based on the operating patterns developed within the expanded Pacific Partnership, has a much better chance of arresting the spread of disease before it reaches pandemic proportions.

Diplomacy in the international arena often deals in soothing abstractions. Positive-sounding messages are thought to help lower tensions and lubricate political gears in favor of more meetings and discussions. In contrast, the extensive cooperative medical, dental, and veterinary effort recommended here offers many substantive advantages. The assistance provided comes with the faces of many nations and many native language skills. It shows a real ability to cooperate in support of perhaps the most profound of all efforts, preventing disease, saving lives, and increasing quality of life. It brings together many disparate and often conflicting national interests in a safe space, allowing habits of cooperation and building the irreplaceable personal connections so necessary to resolution of difficult economic and geopolitical issues. Cooperative and productive human interaction across political, cultural, and geographic boundaries builds a foundation for enhanced cooperation on all issues.
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